Hitler conceived the Ardennes Offensive in the summer of 1944 as a powerful blow to split the Anglo-American armies and regain the initiative on the Western Front. Overriding his generals’ objections, Hitler ordered preparations for a large-scale offensive with the ultimate objective of Antwerp. He believed a severe setback would cause the Allied coalition to collapse, and at least permit the Germans to sue for a separate peace with the English and Americans.
Hitler’s plan called for a surprise armored thrust out of the heavily wooded Ardennes area of Belgium and Luxembourg. The offensive would have to take place in poor weather to prevent Allied aircraft from swarming on the German tanks as they had in Normandy. New “Volksgrenadier” infantry divisions were created from the remnants of units shattered in Normandy, and some of the best panzer divisions were refitted for the effort. All operational and logistical preparations were shrouded in the greatest secrecy. The deception was highly successful; no Allied commander really believed that the Germans were still capable of a powerful counteroffensive in the West, much less that they were actually preparing to launch it.
The main thrust was to be made by the 6. Panzerarmee, organized into two panzer corps with four panzer divisions, two volksgrenadier divisions, and a parachute division. The more powerful 1. SS-Panzerkorps included the rebuilt 1. SS-Panzerdivision, the “Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler.” Along with the other panzer divisions earmarked for the offensive, the LSSAH had received an influx of new personnel and equipment. However, the panzer divisions of late 1944 were no longer as powerful as before. None had a full complement of two tank battalions (one of Panthers and the other of PzKw IVs). Some had their second battalions rounded out with assault guns, while others had corps level heavy tank or tank destroyer battalions attached to replace their missing second battalions.
s. SS-Pz.Abt. 501 was attached to the Leibstandarte’s 1. SS-Panzerregiment as that unit’s second battalion.Following standard German practice, the SS panzer divisions tasked organized their units for combat as combined arms kampfgruppen, or battle groups. Kampfgruppe size and organization varied, but was roughly equivalent to a U.S. reinforced regiment or armored combat command. The 1. SS-Panzerdivision’s priority kampfgruppe assigned to spearhead the attack was built around the 1. SS-Panzerregiment.
The regiment’s commander was one of the most successful Waffen-SS armor leaders, SS-Obersturmbannführer Jochen Peiper. Peiper’s kampfgruppe included his regiment, with a mixed tank battalion of Panthers and PzKw IVs and the attached s. SS-Pz.Abt. 501. Also attached was the third battalion from the division’s 2. SS-Panzergrenadierregiment. This armored infantry battalion, commanded by SS-Sturmbannführer Josef “Jupp” Diefenthal, was mounted in half-tracks. Peiper also had his regiment’s organic pioneer and self-propelled Flak companies, plus an attached battalion from the 1. SS-Panzerartillerieregiment (105mm guns), an additional battery of self-propelled guns, another armored engineer company, and an attached Luftwaffe Flak battalion.
All of the kampfgruppe’s combat elements were motorized and armored.Each of the lead battle groups of the 6. Panzerarmee were to exploit penetrations of the American front lines made by volksgrenadier divisions, then rapidly drive to intermediate objectives on the Meuse River. Army headquarters assigned five routes called rollbahn for the kampfgruppen to use on their way to the Meuse. While not totally restricted to exact routes, the kampfgruppe commanders were to follow the general route of their assigned rollbahn to prevent confusion and traffic jams.
Kampfgruppe Peiper was to use Rollbahn D, which in large part twisted and turned through the hilly terrain along secondary roads barely wide enough for the tanks. Peiper remarked to U.S. interrogators after the war that his assigned route had been fit only for bicycles. (1) Due to his need for swift penetration and exploitation through the restricted terrain, Peiper planned for the Tiger battalion to bring up the rear of his kampfgruppe. The Tigers would then lead through the more open terrain past the Meuse.
The number of tanks fielded by s. SS-Pz.Abt. 501 for the Ardennes Offensive has been a matter of debate. Records and veteran accounts indicate that the battalion received its full complement of 45 Königstigers between 3 October and 3 December 1944. How many of these actually participated in the attack is unknown. According to a former 1. Kompanie tank commander, some did not leave the assembly area.
The battalion was plagued with maintenance problems and breakdowns, even early in the advance. The Army Group B situation map for 17 December 1944 shows 30 Tigers present with the 1. SS-Panzerdivision. At least 20 can be positively identified from photographic evidence or veterans’ accounts. It is probable that the battalion was up to full strength or nearly so by 16 December, but that only around 30-35 of the Tigers actually participated as a unit in the initial advance of Kampfgruppe Peiper. Others were readied or repaired later and fed into the battle as available, but did not catch up with the main body.
The Tiger battalion moved by night into its forward assembly area north of Tondorf on 12 December 1944. While the men knew that they were attached to Peiper’s regiment, the attack orders were kept secret until the last moment. Peiper briefed his battalion and company commanders on 14 December, but the tank commanders and crews were not informed of their mission until the night before the advance.
The Battle 16-18 December: Advance and Loss of Organization 第二部分 16-18日的战斗：前进与混乱的组织
The German offensive began at 5:30 am on 16 December with a massive artillery bombardment. The weather was just what Hitler desired: cold, misty, with ground fog in many areas. Most American front-line units were surprised by the artillery fire and initial breakthrough attacks, but the attacks were not as swiftly successful as the Germans hoped. While Peiper fumed and waited to advance, the volksgrenadiers in his front did not open the way until the afternoon of 16 December. s. SS-Pz.Abt. 501 finally rolled out of its assembly area late in the afternoon. The initial order of march was 2. Kompanie, Headquarters, 3. Kompanie, and 1. Kompanie.
The Tigers followed in the wake of Peiper’s advance through most of the night. The kampfgruppe had elements of a parachute regiment attached as it moved through Lanzerath, and a number of paratroopers hitched a ride on some of the Tigers. The battalion passed through Honsfeld, where one Tiger destroyed two American antitank guns. In the darkness along the muddy, twisting road von Westernhagen’s battalion was already losing its cohesiveness. Several tanks had dropped out with mechanical failures, while others had lagged behind and become separated.
The Tigers made very slow progress on the 17th. The lead elements of the kampfgruppe had churned the country lanes into muddy tracks. Rollbahn D at this point traversed some of the worst roads in the area. The 2. and 3. Kompanies continued through Büllingen, Schoppen, Faymonville, Ondenval, and Thirimont. In several places the assigned road was too tight for the large tanks to pass, and they had to detour through fields, at the risk of bogging down.
By the afternoon of the 17th the battalion had lost its organization. In the evening some of the 2. and 3. Kompanie tanks with the battalion command group passed through Ligneuville (the Germans called this town Engelsdorf) and continued toward Stavelot. On the way toward Ligneuville they passed the Baugnez crossroads south of Malmedy. Earlier in the day this location had become the scene of the infamous “Malmedy Massacre,” as other elements of Kampfgruppe Peiper killed some 80 American prisoners of war.
The exact sequence of events at Baugnez remains a mystery and the truth will probably never be known. Germans who survived the war maintain that the prisoners were killed while they attempted to escape. In 1946 seventy-four former Waffen-SS soldiers (most of them from Kampfgruppe Peiper) were accused of war crimes and tried by a U.S. military court for their actions at Baugnez. Peiper and 42 others were sentenced to death, but none of those convicted were ever executed. Investigations revealed irregularities and illegal actions by the prosecution during the trial, and all were finally released. None of the former soldiers of s. SS-Pz.Abt. 501 were indicted or tried. They could not have been involved; they passed Baugnez after the tragedy had already occurred. However, Peiper’s first notification that a number of American prisoners of war had been shot by his forces came from von Westernhagen as he came forward to Trois Ponts on the morning of 18 December.
The main body of the battalion, consisting of the battalion command group and the 2. and 3. Kompanie tanks that had kept up, closed on the rear of Peiper’s main element during the night of 17 December and followed it through Stavelot the next morning. The kampfgruppe’s lead elements only cleared the streets necessary to move through Stavelot and continue toward Trois Ponts, and American infantry continued to fire at the tanks from other parts of the town. The Königstiger crews returned fire with their machineguns and continued on.
Peiper’s lead elements continued down the N23, a relatively good road, to Trois Ponts. As the name indicates the town contained three bridges. Peiper hoped to cross the Ambleve River there and continue on better roads to the Meuse. However, American engineers blew the bridge over the Ambleve just as the kampfgruppe was coming into sight, and Peiper was forced to turn right onto the N33 road to parallel the river and cross it farther north.
About noon Peiper passed through the small hilltop village of La Gleize and took a local road toward Cheneux, where his scouts had told him a bridge across the Ambleve was intact. He crossed there and continued toward an intersection where he could again take the N23 west. The main part of s. SS-Pz.Abt. 501 still followed in the rear, but was reduced to only six tanks, with one more from the 1. Kompanie following farther behind. The 3. Kompanie had lost two tanks to antitank fire as it passed through Stavelot, and another stalled with a thrown track in a sharp bend on the N33 just before the road turned uphill to enter La Gleize. By this time von Westernhagen and his adjutant, SS-Obersturmführer Kalinowsky, were riding in a command car. Kalinowsky had left his Tiger 008 between Stavelot and Trois Ponts with engine trouble. There is no evidence that the battalion commander’s tank 007 ever left the assembly area.
大约中午的时候，Peiper通过了一个位于山顶的小村镇——La Gleize，并借此的乡村道路通向Cheneux，此时侦察兵告知他位于Ambleve的桥梁完整无损。他绕过这里并继续向前面的一个十字路口进发，从哪里能够重新驶上N23公路的西段。501营的大部分在后面跟随，但也减少了6辆坦克，它们和1连的坦克一起远远落在了后面。在通过Stavelot时，3连损失了2辆坦克，另有一辆因为N33的一个急弯而翻倒路边。此时，von Westernhagen和他的副官，二级突击队中队长Kalinowsky，驾驶一辆指挥车，此前在Stavelot和 Trois Ponts 之间的区域，由于机械故障，Kalinowsky离开了他的008号虎王坦克。（此前没有证据表明营的指挥坦克007号是否离开了集结地。）
SS-Hauptsturmführer Möbius and his three 2. Kompanie tanks continued close behind the main body of the kampfgruppe as it moved out from La Gleize. Just after Peiper crossed the Ambleve on the intact bridge and climbed the hill toward Cheneux American fighter-bombers attacked his column during a two-hour period of cleared weather. The bombing at Cheneux forced the Germans to take cover and disabled a Panther that blocked the road. Peiper reportedly jumped out of SS-Sturmbannführer Diefenthal’s half-track and sought shelter in an old bunker beside the road, from which he emerged soaked with muddy water. None of the Tigers were damaged, but Kalinowsky was wounded in the arm. One of the American P-47s was shot down, perhaps by a Wirbelwind from the 4. Kompanie of s. SS-Pz.Abt. 501.
Fog closed down again around 4:00 p.m. and Peiper continued his advance. He regained the N23 but had to cross a small bridge over the Lienne creek before he could start out of the valley. In the darkness the lead Panthers slowly approached the bridge, only to have it blown in their faces by a squad from the 291st Engineer Combat Battalion.
Peiper, close to the front, is said to have pounded his knee in frustration and sworn, “The damned engineers! The damned engineers!”Peiper sent scouting parties up and down the creek, but they could find no bridges capable of carrying his tanks. He decided to retrace his route through La Gleize and continue his advance toward Stoumont and another bridge farther to the north in the morning. SS-Unterscharführer Karl Wortmann of the kampfgruppe’s Flak company remembered seeing some Königstigers of the 2. Kompanie towing others back toward La Gleize from Cheneux that night. He thought that the tankers were doing this to conserve their rapidly dwindling fuel.
The rest of the operational Tigers were far behind. What was left of the 1. Kompanie attempted to pass through Stavelot during the afternoon of the 18th. SS-Obersturmführer Wessel was leading in Tiger 105. The Americans still controlled much of the town, and stiff enemy fire forced the Tigers to detour from the main route that led toward the town market square. Wessel led his tanks up a steep narrow street called the Rue Haut Rivage. As he reached the top of the street and prepared to turn left on the main road to Trois Ponts, his tank was struck on the gun mantlet by American antitank fire. The fire may have come from an antitank gun near the church, or it may have been from a bazooka in a house; Wessel's radio operator SS-Unterscharführer Belbe reported seeing a flash from a window. Wessel ordered his driver to reverse. The driver evidently lost control of his huge mount; at any rate, he sent it careening backwards into a house in the Rue Haut Rivage. The outer wall collapsed on the tank, immobilizing it. The crew escaped through the hull hatches. Wessel climbed into the next tank and continued toward Trois Ponts, arriving at La Gleize during the night.
此前随后跟进的虎式坦克被越拉越远。1连的这些坦克试图在18号中午穿过Stavelot，二级突击队大队长Wessel驾驶105号领头。美军仍然控制着大多数的村镇，顾忌到敌人的火力威胁，虎式们不得不避开大道。Wessel进入了一个叫做Rue Haut Rivage的非常狭窄的街道，当他准备通过街头转向通往Trois Ponts的道路时，被来自附近一座教堂，或者一座屋子内的美军反坦克炮，或许是火箭筒，击中了火炮上的装甲。Wessel的报务员四级突击队小队长Belbe报告从一个窗户内看到一阵闪光。Wessel命令坦克后退，但显而易见，驾驶员已经对这个庞然大物失去了控制，不管怎样，他还是摇摇晃晃地把坦克倒进了旁边的房屋内。房屋的外墙倒塌在了坦克上，使之无法动弹。乘员们不得不从舱壳逃生口中爬出。Wessel爬进了另一辆坦克，继续向Trois Ponts推进，在傍晚终于抵达了La Gleize。
The fighting caused great damage to buildings and a number of civilian deaths in Stavelot. The citizens had not evacuated the town. Many took shelter in cellars, including that of the Lemaire-Crismer home when Wessel’s tank crashed into the house. A retired man named Jules Grégoire found the means to wet down what remained of the Lemaire-Crismer house and several others nearby, saving them from fire, while the battle raged. Some of the houses in Stavelot still bear the marks of the battle today.
SS-Oberscharführer Jürgen Brandt in Tiger 131 and SS-Oberscharführer Werner Wendt in Tiger 133, plus another tank followed Wessel through Stavelot. They were attacked by the same Allied fighter-bomber sorties that were bombing Peiper’s point elements at Cheneux. Many of the paratroopers riding on the tanks were wounded. After crossing the bridge Brandt’s tank sustained track damage and he was forced to stop, with Wendt behind him. The other tank continued, and Wessel used it to carry on toward Trois Ponts. It was the only 1. Kompanie tank to reach Peiper at La Gleize. Wendt could not pass Brandt’s tank in the narrow street, and the two crews stayed in Stavelot to repair 131.
Other elements of s. SS-Pz.Abt. 501 were even more badly scattered. Tanks that had fallen out or left the assembly area later were forced to try to catch up during darkness after the short winter days. The narrow, muddy roads were difficult enough in daylight. Night movements were reduced to a crawl. Peiper reported after the war that ground guides had led the tanks with white handkerchiefs, and a U.S. half-track commander moving through the Ardennes on the night of 18 December said that it was so dark that he had to walk in front of his vehicle with a flashlight on the back of his belt while a crewman perched on the fender called directions to the driver.
Dawn of 19 December saw the different elements of s. SS-Pz.Abt. 501 widely dispersed. Only six Tigers had made it forward with Kampfgruppe Peiper: the 1. Kompanie tank of SS-Obersturmführer Wessel, SS-Hauptsturmführer Möbius with 204 and two other 2. Kompanie tanks, and two 3. Kompanie tanks. These tanks gathered in and around La Gleize. Peiper placed the defense of this area under the control of von Westernhagen while he attacked Stoumont with the rest of the kampfgruppe’s armor. 19 December passed relatively quietly for the Tigers in La Gleize, except for a short action around 3:00 p.m. against a probing force coming down the Francorchamps road. The Königstiger that had thrown a track at the bottom of the hill where the N33 entered La Gleize destroyed one Sherman and repulsed several others from the 743rd Tank Battalion.
Farther back along the kampfgruppe’s route the fight for Stavelot continued. Both Peiper and his division commander realized that Stavelot was a critical point that must be kept open and under German control. SS-Obersturmbannführer Sandig was ordered to attack through Stavelot from the east with his kampfgruppe of the 2. SS-Panzergrenadierregiment. Several Königstigers that had fallen behind had now reached Stavelot, and assisted his panzergrenadiers with fire support. Among these were Tiger 331 of the battalion commander’s brother, SS-Hauptscharführer Rolf von Westernhagen, and SS-Hauptscharführer Lötzsch’s tank from the 2. Kompanie. Von Westernhagen’s tank suffered a final drive failure and the tank would only drive in reverse, so he had to return to the forward assembly area, but Lötzsch continued to engage the enemy across the river.
围绕Stavelot的战斗仍在继续，Peiper和所有他们师的指挥官们开始意识到Stavelot是一个战役关键点，必须置于德军的绝对控制之下。一级突击队大队长Sandig被命令带领他的第二掷弹兵团从东部攻击前进，通过Stavelot。此前落后的一些虎王此时也抵达了Stavelot，给予装甲掷弹兵们强大的火力支援。在这其中包括营指挥官兄弟Rolf von Westernhagen的331号和来自2营的Lötzsch的坦克。但von Westernhagen的坦克由于一个驾驶失误而需要后退，因此他不得不返回了此前的集结点，但Lötzsch继续战斗阻止敌军穿越河流。
SS-Oberscharführer Kurt Sowa had taken his tank 222 on a route south of Peiper’s area, trying to catch up. Along the way his tank was photographed in four different locations, making it probably the best-recognized tank of the battle! On the afternoon of 19 December he arrived at Stavelot and joined the fighting, firing from beside a house at the south end of the bridge. During the night American engineers blew the bridge and ended any hopes that vehicles could pass through Stavelot to reinforce Peiper.
At the same time as Sandig’s attacks, SS-Sturmbannführer Knittel attacked Stavelot from the west with elements of his 1. SS-Panzeraufklärungsabteilung (armored reconnaissance battalion). The 1. Kompanie Tigers of SS-Oberscharführer Brandt and Wendt assisted this attack. They had driven toward Trois Ponts after spending the night of 18 December in Stavelot. Knittel stopped them at the buildings of the Antoine farm that he had chosen for a command post, and later in the morning had them move back toward Stavelot. The tanks approached the city but could not attack because the road was mined. After they withdrew Knittel directed Wendt to guard his command post and sent Brandt farther west to guard the area of Petit-Spai, where a small bridge spanned the Ambleve and allowed reinforcements from the south to cross.
Peiper withdrew back into Stoumont during the night of 19 December, having been turned back from the alternate route he had tried to reach. He was now essentially cut off in the area of Stoumont - La Gleize, with insufficient fuel to take him farther. He was forced to defend this area and rely on the rest of the division breaking through Stavelot and Trois Ponts to reinforce him. The Americans were feeding more units into the battle to contain and defeat Peiper. While elements of the 30th Infantry Division (including the 740th Tank Battalion) continued to attack Stoumont from the west, the 3rd Armored Division now entered the battle from the north. Combat Command B of the 3rd Armored operated in three battalion task forces. Task Force Jordan moved toward Stoumont from the north, while Task Force McGeorge and the strongest element, Task Force Lovelady, approached La Gleize along narrow roads from the north and northeast.
Peiper and von Westernhagen countered the forces approaching La Gleize by pushing out Tigers and PzKw IVs in blocking positions. TF McGeorge ran into one of these positions about two kilometers north of La Gleize on the road to Bourgomont, where Tiger 334 and a PzKw IV stopped any further advance. Another outpost group, led by the 7. Panzerkompanie’s commander, took up a strong position at the Marechal mill south of La Gleize along the road from Trois Ponts. The 7. Kompanie PzKw IV was joined by SS-Untersturmführer Hantusch’s Tiger and a Puma eight-wheeled armored car from the reconnaissance battalion.
The PzKw IV’s driver, SS-Rottenführer Rolf Ehrhardt, recalled after the war that dense fog kept the group from observing much. At one point an American dismounted element approached close to the mill, only to be driven back by fire from the Puma. In the afternoon the group discovered a large armored force (TF Lovelady) moving south on the road from Francorchamps, just to the east of their position. The tank driver turned scout suggested that the Tiger pick off the first tank while the PzKw IV destroyed the last, which would prevent the rest of the tanks from deploying and make them easy targets. SS-Untersturmführer Hantusch is said to have refused to take part in the plan, saying “Fire uphill? I’m not tired of living, and I only have three centimeters of armor on top.”
While the tanks at the mill were well sited to turn back advances from Trois Ponts, it is difficult to imagine how they could have engaged the American tanks of TF Lovelady without moving from their prepared positions. The Francorchamps road averages about 50 meters higher in elevation than the mill and is about 600 meters away. The road cannot be seen from the mill. At any rate, TF Lovelady pushed on toward Trois Ponts, along the way ambushing several vehicles that were moving north to reinforce Peiper. When the lead Shermans of E Company 33rd Armored Regiment tried to move from Trois Ponts toward Stavelot they were driven back by antitank guns and Brandt’s Königstiger near the Petit-Spai bridge, and four were destroyed.
The fight for Stavelot continued on 20 December. Early in the day Brandt and Wendt again supported a reconnaissance battalion attack. The Americans brought heavy artillery fire and air support into play, and the attack was repulsed. Kampfgruppe Sandig attacked repeatedly from the south, but could not cross the river. While supporting these attacks Tiger 222 was knocked out by an antitank round at the southern approach to the bridge. Since the tank did not catch fire, 222’s crew remained inside until they could escape during darkness.
This is almost certainly the same action described by Captain Raney of the 823rd Tank Destroyer Battalion, whose M-10 tank destroyers were firing at the Tigers:We saw the long tube of the Tiger’s 88mm gun emerge from behind the last building. The M-10 gunner must have been tracking the tank with his telescopic sight, for as the Tiger cleared the building, the M-10 fired one round of armor piercing shot which penetrated the armor on the right side above the track, about 14 inches under the turret and four to five feet to the rear of the front glacis plate. The Tiger stopped in its tracks... Surprisingly the tank did not burn.
One by one, a few Tigers continued to arrive at Stavelot and assist the battle. However, most were still broken down far behind. The battalion’s workshop company had established a maintenance area in Ligneuville. A number of tanks were recovered there to be repaired, but spare parts and fuel were in short supply. Peiper would get no further reinforcements from his heavy tank battalion.
第四部分 The Battle 21-25 December: The Cauldron of La Gleize, and the Final Struggle for Stavelot 21-25日的战斗：La Gleize“大锅”，Stavelot最后的战斗
By 21 December Peiper had decided to withdraw all his forces to the immediate area of La Gleize. His only possible course of action was to defend his position with ever dwindling hopes of relief from his division. The American pincers continued to close on the kampfgruppe: the 30th Infantry Division hammered away from the west, the 3rd Armored Division approached from the north and northeast, and the 82nd Airborne Division attacked Peiper from the southwest. With increasing fury the Americans brought the power of their artillery to bear. Most of the 105mm guns of the 30th Infantry Division’s artillery group bombarded Peiper 21-22 December, along with a 155mm gun commandeered by the 740th Tank Battalion commander. Peiper’s artillery was almost out of ammunition and virtually silent.
The Königstigers defended an arc that covered the northeastern to southeastern approaches to La Gleize. This area included some excellent fields of fire, with long range shots to enemy approach routes. During the consolidation on La Gleize the blocking group at the Marechal mill moved onto high ground at the Werimont farm a few hundred meters southeast of the village. Hantusch’s Tiger and the PzKw IV were reinforced at the farm by Tiger 213 and two Panthers. SS-Hauptsturmführer Möbius’s Tiger 204 was positioned beside an orchard at the eastern edge of the village. Tiger 334 guarded the Hassoumont farm area to the northeast, while the 3. Kompanie tank that had thrown a track while approaching on the N33 from the east was still manned. One other Königstiger, probably a 1. Kompanie tank used by SS-Obersturmführer Wessel, ended the battle on a narrow side street of the village. Whether this poor location was its final fighting position or it had broken down there is unknown.
This is probably the same action seen by Charles Corbin, an observer with the 3rd Armored Division’s 391st Armored Artillery Battalion. Corbin was posted in a house on the edge of Stavelot, from which he saw what he described as a Mark VI Tiger tank close by in some trees. As the tank moved a Sherman of TF Lovelady also in Stavelot took it under fire, “but three balls of fire bounced off of it and it backed away never moving its turret.” The shot that damaged Wendt’s tank was probably from this Sherman. The Germans realized that they would not be able to reopen the route to Peiper through Stavelot, and went over to the defensive.
Peiper was trapped in what the Germans called the “cauldron” of La Gleize. The Americans mounted no strong attacks on 23 December, but continued their intense artillery fire. German tank fuel and ammunition were exhausted. Peiper, unable to advance further and knowing that he would get no relief, had begun the day before requesting permission from 1. SS-Panzerdivision to withdraw. Radio contact was sporadic, and the answers Peiper received convinced him that the division did not realize the severity of his situation. One radio message notified him that six Königstigers were operational at Stavelot and asked where they should be sent. “By airdrop to La Gleize” was Peiper’s aggravated answer.
Finally on 23 December Peiper received permission to break his force out of La Gleize and move to link up with his division. The remaining 850 soldiers of the kampfgruppe moved out on foot at 2:00 am on 24 December. With them were the officers and men of s. SS-Pz.Abt. 501 who had fought in La Gleize: von Westernhagen; his adjutant Kalinowsky (who was wounded); company commanders Wessel, Möbius, and Birnschein (badly wounded); and the remaining Tiger crews. The wounded who could not walk were left behind in the village under the care of SS medics. Also left behind was a small defensive covering force, which had the mission of wrecking the remaining operational tanks and heavy weapons after the kampfgruppe departed. For the next day and a half Peiper led his men along a circuitous route through the woods which he hoped would avoid enemy patrols and bring him to the German positions east of the Salm River. After several brushes with the enemy the kampfgruppe elements crossed the Salm and reached the lines of the 1. SS-Panzerdivision. Most of the men had to swim the Salm, and von Westernhagen described the men of his group as walking icicles as they reached the division command post on Christmas morning.
Scattered elements of s. SS-Pz.Abt. 501 continued to fight. On Christmas morning SS-Oberscharführer Wendt received word that the reconnaissance battalion was withdrawing across the Ambleve. Wendt sent his loader to inform his platoon leader, SS-Oberscharführer Brandt, of the withdrawal. As Brandt climbed down from his tank an American shell, the only one of the morning, fell right in front of him. Brandt was mortally wounded and Wendt’s loader was killed. Another crew managed to drive Brandt’s Tiger across the Ambleve and link up with the rest of their company. Wendt and his driver prepared to destroy their immobilized tank 133 with demolition charges in the turret and engine compartment. They set the charges and crossed the river on an improvised infantry bridge.
As they climbed the opposite slope they continued to watch their tank, but Wendt never saw the charges explode. The explosives may have gone off later, as a U.S. Air Force observer reported in the summer of 1945 seeing a Royal Tiger at the Petit Spai bridge with the rear of the turret and the frontal hull roof smashed in, though he attributed this damage to Allied bombing. SS-Untersturmführer Kalinowsky’s 008, which had been left with engine trouble near Knittel’s command post at the Ferme Antoine between Stavelot and Trois Ponts, continued to fight on until its crew set it on fire and withdrew with the last elements of the reconnaissance battalion Christmas morning.
Christmas Day also saw one of the strangest episodes of s. SS-Pz.Abt. 501’s actions in the Ardennes. On Christmas morning SS-Unterscharführer Blase in Tiger 332 was moving north along the N33 through the small village of Coo-Biester, about five kilometers south of La Gleize. He was probably trying to link up with Kampfgruppe Peiper, but how he had reached the area and why he was still moving toward La Gleize on 25 December remain a mystery. At the same time, elements of the 740th Tank Battalion were moving south along the N33 after the capture of La Gleize. Sergeant Glenn George in a Sherman encountered 332 parked on the side of the road. George immediately directed his gunner to fire at the Tiger. The crew had a white phosphorous shell loaded, and the smoke from this exploding shell apparently caused the German crew to think their vehicle was on fire. To George’s surprise they opened their hatches and scrambled out of the Tiger. George chased them off with machinegun fire and continued his advance. Later a unit of the 463rd Ordnance Evacuation Company recovered the still operational Tiger 332 and transported it to Spa. It was eventually shipped to Aberdeen Proving Ground, one of the first Königstigers captured by the Americans.
The actions to support Kampfgruppe Peiper took a heavy toll of s. SS-Pz.Abt. 501. At least 12 Tigers had been knocked out or abandoned between Stavelot and La Gleize, and many more were unavailable due to mechanical failure. The battalion regrouped and moved into an assembly area east of Vielsalm to refit and reorganize. The 1. Kompanie handed its tanks over to the other companies and departed for Sennelager in Germany to receive new tanks. The remaining Tigers, approximately 15, were grouped into a kampfgruppe commanded by SS-Hauptsturmführer Möbius. This unit fought alongside Peiper’s remaining tanks as the 1. SS-Panzerdivision attacked south of Bastogne on 30-31 December in an attempt to cut the corridor that U.S. forces had opened to that beleaguered city. At least two more Königstigers were lost in those battles. The remainder withdrew with the rest of the division at the beginning of January to refit in the Köln area.
Some Tiger crewmen were rewarded for their efforts in the Ardennes Offensive. SS-Unterscharführer Fritz Belbe was the radio operator on SS-Obersturmführer Wessel's 1. Kompanie command tank. When Wessel's Tiger 105 crashed into the house in Stavelot and Wessel jumped to a different tank, he apparently took Belbe with him. After the battle Wessel listed the engagements that Belbe had fought in and recommended him to receive the Panzerkampfabzeichen (Tank Battle Badge) in Silver. SS-Obersturmbannführer von Westernhagen approved the award on 30 January 1945.
The 501st SS Heavy Tank Battalion did not fight again as a unit. The bulk of the battalion accompanied the 1. SS-Panzerdivision to Hungary in late January and fought through Hungary and Austria to the end of the war. Part of the 1. Kompanie and other elements that had remained in Germany drew a few new tanks and continued to fight as the Americans approached Bielefeld.
In early April the surviving crewmen were moved by train to Austria and united with the rest of the battalion. SS-Obersturmbannführer von Westernhagen had died on 20 March 1945 in Hungary. The remnants of his battalion surrendered to the Americans in Austria. The Tigers had roared their last.
第六部分 What Happened to the Tanks After the Battle? 战后发生了什么？
As the Germans withdrew when their offensive failed, the Ardennes area was littered with destroyed and abandoned vehicles. The SS Tiger battalion left seven of its tanks (204, 211, 213, 332, 334, the unnumbered one in the Chemin Vielle-Voie, and the one in the curve below the village) in or near La Gleize. Some of these behemoths seriously impeded the movement of U.S. forces through the area, and after initial checks to ensure they had not been booby-trapped the tanks were simply pushed from the roadway by bulldozer or whatever heavy vehicle was available. Others were left in place until after the war’s end, and scrap metal dealers eventually salvaged them. Many of them were taken to the large steel foundries in Liege. Before they were dismantled and hauled away, some became local landmarks.
The Ardennes Offensive was the first time American units had faced the Königstiger in substantial numbers, and two of the captured tanks were immediately recovered for study. Tiger 204 was left in an orchard field just off the main road in La Gleize. The U.S. First Army’s 463rd Ordnance Evacuation Company found that 204 was still in running condition, and the ordnance soldiers attempted to recover the tank.
Tiger 332 had a more interesting recovery career. After its capture on 25 December by the 740th Tank Battalion, a unit of the 463rd Ordnance Evacuation Company found 332 and on 26 December brought up a heavy tank recovery tractor-trailer. They loaded 332 and set off, spending a night in Stavelot and eventually reaching Spa, where they left the Tiger at the railway station for further recovery. In February 1945 an Ordnance Technical Inspection Team assigned to First Army from Aberdeen Proving Ground transported 332 to Antwerp and shipped it to Aberdeen for examination and testing.
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